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I. Introduction
How the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has grown. The
Supreme Court’s 1963 decision Gideon v. Wainwright,1
interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to obligate the
state to provide indigent felony defendants with counsel,2 is the
only criminal procedure decision the Court considers as deserving
the title of a “watershed” ruling because of the degree to which it
effected a “profound” and “sweeping” change.3 This Symposium
celebrates it. Yet the fifty years since Gideon have been marked
by rulings that have carried water for Gideon, including by
extending its meaning, pushing the regulation of counsel’s
∗ Roy L. and Rosamund Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law. I thank for their invaluable comments Darryl Brown,
John Monahan, and participants at the conference at Washington and Lee
School of Law, for which this symposium piece was prepared.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. See id. at 334–36 (requiring that states provide indigent criminal
defendants with counsel at criminal trial).
3. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417–21 (2007) (comparing the
weight of Gideon to that of Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004)).
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performance into other stages of the criminal process, redefining
how postconviction litigation is structured, and affecting the
interpretation of other criminal procedure rights. Conversely,
while Gideon required that indigent defendants charged with a
felony receive state-appointed counsel,4 the quality of indigent
defense has been widely deplored, and the regulation of the
effectiveness of counsel has, from its inception, been a fraught
postconviction intervention into problems of legal ethics and the
constitutional fairness of criminal convictions.
The subsequent elaboration of the Gideon right was chiefly in
the postconviction context, and that alone says much about what
has happened since. It was in Strickland v. Washington,5 more
than twenty years after Gideon’s Trumpet sounded, that the
Court cemented the principle that a defendant is entitled not just
to a lawyer, but to a reasonably effective advocate.6 The Court
ruled, however, that a trial verdict should not be reversed even if
the defense performed so unreasonably as to be constitutionally
ineffective, so long as those failures did not materially prejudice
the outcome.7 The Court’s ruling itself suggested that the
entitlement to a reasonably effective advocate would be a thin
one. The Court denied relief in the case and encouraged lower
courts to conduct a harmless error-type inquiry into the
effectiveness of counsel, rather than rule on the effectiveness of
counsel.8 Relief under Strickland tended to be confined to
outright conflicts of interest or unusually disastrous errors by
counsel.9

4. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 334–36.
5. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
6. See id. at 685–87 (establishing the right to effective assistance of
counsel).
7. See id. at 687 (establishing the prejudice prong of Strickland’s two-part
test for proving effective assistance of counsel).
8. See id. at 693 (“Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as
likely to be utterly harmless . . . . Even if a defendant shows that particular
errors of counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that
they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.”).
9. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1997) (“Defendants tend to
win ineffective assistance claims only when their lawyers had a conflict of
interest or made some discrete error of great magnitude.”).
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The Court may not have predicted just how pervasive
Strickland v. Washington claims would become. In this Article, I
describe how ineffective assistance of counsel claims came to
dominate and define federal habeas litigation, changed the
structure of state postconviction rules in reaction to the new
prominence of ineffective assistance of counsel claims at the
federal level, and raised quite difficult questions for
postconviction courts. Over time, ineffective assistance of counsel
claims provided a sort of umbrella claim to examine a wide range
of trial-related questions. More recently, additional types of
errors have become the subject of regulation, creating new
applications for ineffective assistance of counsel claims during
habeas litigation. The Court extended the right to encourage
provision of state postconviction counsel.10 The right was quickly
extended to apply to inadequate defense lawyering during plea
bargaining,11 and more recently the Court has expanded the
analysis to make clear that the Sixth Amendment now applies to
all “critical stages of a criminal proceeding.”12
As a result, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been
transformed from a pretrial entitlement to a central—if
sporadically enforced—means for regulating the entire criminal
process. Despite, or perhaps because of, its mounting centrality to
the Sixth Amendment Gideon right and more generally to the
entire apparatus of criminal procedure, the Strickland v.
Washington inquiry is notoriously malleable. It is not clear, even
putting to one side how well the analysis is conducted, that
judges rely on the appropriate factors when deciding whether
errors by counsel were either constitutionally unreasonable, or, in
fact, sufficiently prejudiced the outcome at trial. As William
Stuntz put it well, “[b]oth kinds of prejudice are probably beyond
judges’ capacity to determine accurately,” because “good data on

10. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (holding
“[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may
establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial”).
11. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (noting that because our
criminal law system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials,” the right to counsel must be extended to the plea bargain process).
12. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012).
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the effects of different defense tactics do not exist.”13 Indeed, I
will develop how judges may do poorly even when evaluating
subjects on which there is some good data, because of their
reliance on suppositions about the impact of evidence on jurors
that are implausible or have been called into question by social
science research.
Could the approach towards judging effectiveness of defense
counsel be “validated” by social science evidence, or at least be
better informed by it? Does the Supreme Court’s test for
assessing whether to remedy ineffective defense representation
itself generate information about what it purports to examine?
Apart from the validity of the method itself, is the test reliable in
its application?14 Quite a bit is known about some types of
evidence, such as eyewitness evidence and confession evidence,
and how they impact jurors. Not enough is known about what
impact many other types of evidence have on a jury, much less
how those types of evidence impact jurors when contaminated by
attorney error, or when not presented at all due to a failure to
investigate. Social science research has tended to focus on jury
decisionmaking, and not enough has been done to research the
role that lawyering plays during trials. Perhaps such research
could place Strickland v. Washington, and harmless error more
generally, on a stronger empirical footing. Nor has enough social
science work been done to examine how criminal defendants
might make decisions in plea negotiations (more work has been
done on competence of defendants and on lawyering in juvenile
cases)15 in order to better analyze prejudice regarding collateral
13. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution Of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REV. 780, 824 n.231 (2006).
14. On the term “validity,” see Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (“[S]cientists typically distinguish between
‘validity’ (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and ‘reliability’
(does application of the principle produce consistent results?).”). Of course,
inquiry into the effect of representation by counsel could also be an “unreliable”
analysis. I focus here on whether the method of inquiry into the effectiveness of
defense representation itself has valid underpinnings; does the test provide
information about what it purports to examine?
15. See generally NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE:
THE MACARTHUR STUDIES (2002) (presenting five studies exploring the role of
defense attorneys and the competence of defendants in juvenile cases). The
MacArthur studies explore the perceptions of defense attorneys concerning
clients’ competence and participation in decisionmaking during plea
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consequences of a conviction and questions regarding likely
outcomes had defense counsel advised the defendant more
carefully regarding a plea offer from the prosecution.16
Part of the problem is that judges have developed ineffective
assistance review in the context of postconviction review. The test
for ineffective assistance of defense counsel is shot through with
prejudice analysis, as well as with a set of artificial blinders:
judgments that only certain types of failures by counsel will be
regulated. Judicial deference to the “wide range of professional
conduct,” is based on values including finality, legal ethics, and
professional codes, as well as accuracy.17 Bracketing such ethical
and normative questions, insights from existing research suggest
that improving the accuracy of plea bargaining and trial
outcomes can best occur through development and documentation
of more accurate evidence in the earlier stages of criminal
investigations, and not through after-the-fact postconviction
review, which will be sporadic, deferential, and perhaps not
particularly accurate. I conclude, as others have long maintained,
that to ensure at the front end that adequately trained and
resourced counsel exist—rather than to try to assess failures
after the fact—would be far more promising. Providing adequate
resources for defense lawyers has been politically unpopular and
practically intractable in many jurisdictions. However,
identifying priorities for allocating resources to areas of need,
negotiations, findings concerning attorney behavior, competence and responses
of attorneys representing clients of doubtful competence during the plea
bargaining process; examining role of competence in cases proceeding to a trial;
debrief both attorneys and clients; and study insanity plea decisions. Id. For
discussion of research concerning adjudicative competence of juveniles, see, for
example, id. at 146–51 (reviewing literature).
16. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (declaring that
prong one of Strickland—reasonable professional assistance—requires that
attorneys advise their clients about the risk of deportation (a collateral
consequence) when considering pleading guilty to a crime).
17. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (ruling that the
court’s examination of whether an attorney’s representation was professionally
reasonable under the circumstances must be highly deferential); see also
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (“We have declined to articulate
specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead have
emphasized that the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” (internal quotations and
citation omitted)).

932

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 927 (2013)

including areas of potential error—validating Gideon—can help
to prioritize resources to avoid serious miscarriages of justice.
Social science research may help to identify ways to better train
defense lawyers, inform discovery and other pretrial investigative
practices, create standards for representation during plea
bargaining, and evaluate expert evidence.18 The defense bar has
increasingly engaged with science and social science to improve
standards for effective defense representation. Social scientists in
turn might more closely study lawyering in pretrial stages of the
criminal process—and over time, this may help to validate
Gideon.
II. The Expanding Reach of Strickland v. Washington
In the tradition of Marbury v. Madison,19 major
constitutional developments can come from decisions in which the
Supreme Court denies relief to the party that seeks a novel
constitutional remedy. The meaning of the Court’s ruling may be
less immediately apparent when the Court recognizes a
constitutional claim for the first time but then denies relief. I will
return to Gideon, the case whose fifty-year anniversary we
celebrate in this Symposium. My primary subject is Strickland v.
Washington, whose importance to the conduct of defense lawyers
at criminal trials and the role of habeas corpus review was
particularly unexpected, given the facts of the case and the
Court’s analysis of the role that counsel plays at a trial.
The defendant, David Leroy Washington, was charged with
committing three murders.20 He was not an ideal client, to put it
mildly. He confessed to the police against his attorney’s advice.21
He then pleaded guilty, again contrary to his attorney’s advice,

18. See, e.g., DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS 16 (2012) (providing overview of recommendations to rely on
more “accurate and transparent evidence” permitting “the legal actors’ trust in
the evidence and limit[ing] their ability to distort and hide it” and “narrowing
the opportunities for both unjust prosecutions and frivolous defenses”).
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
20. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672 (describing the charges against
Washington).
21. Id.
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and waived the right to a jury.22 Perhaps discouraged by each of
those decisions, his attorney put on a very thin sentencing case.23
The attorney viewed his client as competent, and spoke only to
family members without consulting an expert, seeking a
psychiatric exam, or providing any witnesses at all, including
character witnesses.24 He did little more than ask for the judge’s
mercy and present his client’s remorse.25 Washington was
sentenced to death.26
The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not
just guarantee an indigent defendant an attorney, or an attorney
free from state interference, but that in order to safeguard the
fairness of the trial, a defendant is also entitled to a minimally
effective attorney.27 The Court set out two prongs to the analysis.
First, the Court held that to be constitutionally ineffective, the
attorney’s performance must deviate from a standard of
“reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”28 That
standard relies on professional standards and practice as “guides”
at least29—not on evidence concerning what errors in fact
prejudice cases—although unreasonable performance is of the
type that would hurt a client’s case, and therefore prejudice is
relevant to this first prong of the analysis as well. To the extent
that the first prong looks at what happened in the defendant’s
case, after asking what the lawyer did and whether it comported
with reasonable professional norms, the judge must then look at
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 673 (explaining how Washington’s counsel performed
deficiently).
25. See id. at 673–74 (reciting the events occurring during Washington’s
plea colloquy).
26. Id. at 675.
27. Id. at 685–86 (citing prior rulings such as Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80 (1976), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14 (1970), and
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 593–596 (1961), which dealt with claims of
state interference with performance of counsel, with the exception of Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), dealing with a conflict of interest, the Court had
“never directly and fully addressed a claim of “actual ineffectiveness” of
counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial”).
28. Id. at 716.
29. Id. at 688 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is
reasonable, but they are only guides.”).
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whether, given the context of the defendant’s case, the decision to
adopt a course of action was a reasonable strategic decision.30
There is substantial deference to the reasonable strategic
decisions a lawyer might have hypothetically made and a
reluctance to second-guess decisions the lawyer did make.31
The second prong of the test focuses on whether failures of
counsel—those so egregious as to be constitutionally
unreasonable—are errors that materially or reasonably
prejudiced the outcome at trial, such that “counsel’s errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.”32 This approach was taken “[b]ecause of the
difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”33 By this
time, the Court had already moved towards such a two-prong
approach, recognizing in Cuyler v. Sullivan34 in 1980 that
outright conflicts of interest may impugn the entire course of
representation, but that the court should nevertheless ask
whether the conflict prejudiced counsel’s performance.35 However,
the interest in assuring that errors by counsel in fact affected the
trial outcome did not support the first move: to “indulge a strong
presumption” that attorneys’ conduct is within a “wide range” of
permissible assistance.36 The Court did not explain why that
presumption should be a “strong” one, nor why a general
presumption like that is necessary in the circumstance in which

30. See id. at 689 (“The defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’” (quoting Michael v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
31. See id. (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential . . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.”).
32. Id. at 687.
33. Id. at 689.
34. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
35. See id. at 350 (“[T]he possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a
criminal conviction. In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer’s performance.”).
36. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
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the attorney in fact did something highly prejudicial in a given
case.37
This test would not be easy to satisfy; the error must be
doubly unreasonable and prejudicial as to both the professional
norms at the time surrounding representation in general and the
actual impact on the defendant’s case.38 In Washington’s case, the
Court denied relief, emphasizing that “[t]he evidence that
respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the
sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing
profile presented to the sentencing judge.”39 Was there no
reasonable probability that this evidence would have made a
difference? Symptomatic of the malleability of the test, and its
limited application, from 1984 until 2000, the Court did not
recognize that failures to investigate mitigating evidence at
sentencing in a death penalty case could constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In a series of decisions, beginning with Williams v. Taylor40
in 2000, the Court has since emphasized the importance of
presenting a mitigation case.41 That change in approach tracked
not just guidelines in professional associations, but a series of
social science studies that documented the importance of
developing mitigation evidence.42 On the other hand, the Court
37. See id. (failing to specifically discuss the necessity of a presumption
condoning attorney conduct).
38. See id. at 690 (“The court must then determine whether . . . the
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance. . . . [T]he court should keep in mind that counsel’s
function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the
adversarial testing process work in the particular case.”).
39. Id. at 699–700.
40. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
41. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380–81 (2012) (“This case, like
some others recently, looks to norms of adequate investigation in preparing for
the sentencing phase of a capital trial, when defense counsel’s job is to counter
the State’s evidence of aggravated culpability with evidence in mitigation.”);
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (stating that the Court must “focus
on whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce
mitigation evidence of [the defendant’s] background was itself reasonable”);
Williams, 529 U.S. at 399 (validating the state trial judge’s conclusion that the
postconviction record should be allowed as mitigation evidence).
42. See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death Qualified Jury and
the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984) (studying the value of
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has emphasized that professional guidelines are not “inexorable
commands with which all capital defense counsel ‘must fully
comply.’”43
During that time, Strickland v. Washington had already
taken on central importance in redefining criminal trial practice
and postconviction review. Ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are the most commonly litigated claims during
postconviction proceedings.44 One reason is a chameleon-like
adaptability. They are umbrella claims that can broadly
incorporate all sorts of theories about what went wrong at the
criminal trial—just so long as those failures can be attributed to
defense counsel. Given pervasive inadequacies in indigent
defense in this country, such attribution can often quite plausibly
be made. While perhaps aspirational, the American Bar
Association has adopted far more detailed guidelines for the
performance of defense lawyers in death penalty cases.45 Of
course, another reason for the ubiquity of such claims may be the
deplorable state of indigent defense representation in many
jurisdictions; nevertheless, relief is rare on ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, just as relief is rare in criminal appeals and
postconviction proceedings in general.
Moreover, the Strickland v. Washington standard colonized
other areas of postconviction law, or rather, it reflected the
Supreme Court playing the role of a habeas corpus boa
constrictor, and tightening the standard for showing harmless
due process guarantees upon people who are not allowed to serve on juries based
on their opposition to the death penalty); Leona D. Jochnowitz, How Capital
Jurors Respond to Mitigating Evidence of Defendant’s Mental Illness,
Retardation, and Situational Impairments: An Analysis of the Legal and Social
Science Literature, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 839 (2011) (studying the legal and
empirical literature regarding jury decision making).
43. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2009) (quoting Van Hook v.
Anderson, 560 F.3d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 2009)).
44. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION
IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED
BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY
ACT OF 1996, at 28 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf
(stating that eighty-one percent of the capital cases included an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim).
45. See Am. Bar Ass’n, American Bar Association Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003).
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error in several postconviction areas at the same time. The
heightened showing of prejudice, the “reasonable probability”
standard that was more demanding than that typically required
to show an error not harmless, came to be extended to other
contexts. The year after Strickland v. Washington was decided,
the Court revisited the Brady v. Maryland46 rule regarding
suppression of exculpatory evidence, which had used the term
“materiality,”47 and in United States v. Bagley48 adopted the
Strickland v. Washington usage: “The evidence is material only if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”49 This was
part of a general approach in which the Court, by the late 1970s,
increasingly focused on limiting reversals based on whether error
sufficiently affected the outcome; Strickland v. Washington had
in turn relied on United States v. Agurs,50 a 1976 ruling regarding
the scope of the Brady v. Maryland right by the Court.51
The Supreme Court then adopted that more stringent
standard for all federal habeas proceedings when it revisited the
harmless error standard in federal habeas corpus in Brecht v.
Abrahamson.52 As a result, the second “prejudice” prong of the
standard became unexceptional once it was extended across the
board—although state courts can adopt more defendant-friendly

46. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
47. Id. at 88 (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (emphasis added)).
48. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
49. Id. at 682.
50. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
51. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“[T]he
appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for materiality of
exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution . . . .”
(citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 112–13)).
52. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993) (“Since our
landmark decision in Chapman v. California [386 U.S. 18 (1967)], we have
applied the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in reviewing claims
of constitutional error of the trial type.”).
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versions of the standard, because they must generally follow a
less strenuous pre-Brecht harmless error rule.53
Ineffective assistance litigation would reshape habeas corpus
in unanticipated ways, including by fundamentally altering the
relationship between state and federal habeas. While Strickland
v. Washington claims are the claims petitioners most frequently
assert during federal habeas proceedings, judges rarely grant
relief on them.54 The claims often cannot be asserted in state
courts during direct appeals (as with Brady claims, they may
require analysis of new evidence not introduced at the original
trial, which many state courts do not permit on appeal)—making
state habeas proceedings far more important to developing an
adequate record.55 As a result, other aspects of habeas corpus law
were influenced by the litigation of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. States had to create postconviction procedures to
accommodate the litigation of federal constitutional claims that
could not readily be raised during direct appeals. The Supreme
Court then elaborated procedural default rules requiring
exhaustion of those state habeas procedures. The Court adopted a
“cause and prejudice” exception to certain procedural failures and
required a showing of independent constitutional ineffectiveness
of counsel for a failure of counsel to constitute cause.56
53. States have also adopted different approaches to the postconviction
standard for IAC, and while they cannot adopt a standard that tolerates
constitutional error, they may grant more expansive relief; a few states have
done so by relaxing the prejudice requirement. See Jan Lucas, A Cumulative
Approach To Ineffective Assistance: New York’s Requirement That Counsel’s
Cumulative Efforts Amount To Meaningful Representation: Supreme Court Of
New York Appellate Division, Second Department, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1073, 1083–
86 (2012) (listing New York, Alaska, Oregon, Hawaii, and Massachusetts as
states that have adopted a standard with a relaxed prejudice requirement).
54. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role
in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 811 (2009) (“A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in trial or appellate proceedings was raised in
about half of the 2,384 noncapital cases the Vanderbilt–NCSC study assessed.
Only one of those claims was granted; that grant was later reversed.”).
55. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679,
682–83 (2007) (proposing that trial records be opened on appeal to permit
litigation of trial attorney performance).
56. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (“[W]e think that the
existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the
prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded
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More recently, the Supreme Court emphasized in Cullen v.
Pinholster57 the “doubly deferential” review under the AEDPA58
and the Strickland v. Washington standard, and ruled that a
federal court may not consider evidence of ineffective assistance
that had not been previously developed during state habeas
proceedings (even when there was no hearing conducted in state
court).59
This cascade of unanticipated developments in turn placed
greater pressure on the Supreme Court to ensure adequate
process during state habeas litigation—leading to the result in
last Term’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan60 that a pro se petitioner
does not waive a “substantial” ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim not brought in state postconviction proceedings.61
In addition, although the Court has held that Fourth Amendment
claims may not be raised during federal habeas corpus, the claim
may be raised if it is Strickland v. Washington that brings such
claims under its umbrella—making cognizable the failure of
defense counsel to assert that underlying Fourth Amendment
claim at trial.62 The Sixth Amendment has in effect expanded the
scope of habeas corpus, or at least partially undone its
contraction.
The Sixth Amendment now “requires effective assistance of
counsel at critical stages of a criminal proceeding” and not just at
counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”).
57. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
58. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scatted sections of the
U.S.C.).
59. See id. at 1403 (“Our review of the California Supreme Court’s decision
is thus ‘doubly deferential.’” (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411,
1413 (2009))).
60. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
61. See id. at 1320 (“Where, under state law, [IAC claims] must be raised in
an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a
federal habeas court from hearing a substantial [IAC claim] if, in the initialreview collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding
was ineffective.”).
62. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (“[A] good Fourth
Amendment claim alone will not earn a prisoner federal habeas relief. Only
those habeas petitioners who can prove under Strickland that they have been
denied a fair trial by the gross incompetence of their attorneys will be granted
the writ . . . .”).
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trial.63 Typically, appeals and habeas are waived in the vast
majority of cases in which there is a plea bargain. Now habeas
plays a greater role in plea bargained cases, because ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrine plays a greater role in plea
bargaining. As noted, the Supreme Court extended the test for
evaluating adequacy of defense lawyering to plea bargaining in
Hill v. Lockhart64 in 1985, and then ruled that the analysis
includes advice to clients concerning collateral consequences such
as immigration consequences of a conviction in Padilla v.
Kentucky65 in 2010. The Court expanded the prejudice analysis in
Missouri v. Frye66 and Lafler v. Cooper67 in 2012 to include the
situation in which the issue is not incorrect advice concerning the
plea, but ineffective assistance during the representation that led
to the acceptance or rejection of the plea.68 The Court noted in
Frye that “[b]argaining is, by its nature, defined to a substantial
degree by personal style.”69 There may be difficult questions in
defining the duties of defense counsel, apart from adequately
communicating the terms of a plea offer, and difficult questions in
assessing prejudice.70 As a result, there may not be a flood of
63. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012).
64. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (“Where, as here, a
defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea
upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether
counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.’” (quoting McCann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))).
65. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (stating that
counsel’s failure to inform a defendant of how a plea will affect his immigration
status can be considered ineffective assistance).
66. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
67. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
68. See id. at 1387 (“If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the
right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it.”);
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (“[P]lea bargains have become so central to the
administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have
responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to
render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in
the criminal process at critical stages.”).
69. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
70. The Frye Court emphasized that the “American Bar Association
recommends defense counsel ‘promptly communicate and explain to the
defendant all plea offers made by the prosecuting attorney,’ and this standard
has been adopted by numerous state and federal courts over the last 30 years.”
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cases in which habeas relief is granted on ineffective assistance
claims concerning plea bargaining.
A consistent theme is that even though the Sixth
Amendment has been extended to regulate each “critical” stage in
the criminal process, claims of Sixth Amendment violations are
typically asserted during habeas proceedings, in which prejudice
may be hard to show and relief is rare. Outside the postconviction
process, ineffective assistance of counsel challenges are difficult
to raise. The Court held prior to Strickland v. Washington that
public defenders could not be sued as state actors,71 making
challenges to patterns and practices of ineffective assistance far
more difficult; more indirect suits have largely failed, although
systemic litigation has had some success in state courts.72
III. Validating Strickland v. Washington
A. Jury Research
While the Strickland v. Washington analysis of the
effectiveness of defense representation has expanded to cover all
crucial aspects of the criminal process, this central form of
regulation is administered chiefly postconviction, and without
much attention to whether the identified errors are in fact of the
type that prejudice outcomes in criminal cases. One reason may
be that the analysis is not purely an outcome-driven prejudice
analysis, but it also focuses on standards of professional
performance and legal ethics. Even as to prejudice portions of the
analysis, much could be improved. Perhaps professional and
ethics standards could similarly be better informed in some
respects by what actually influences decisionmaking.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
71. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (deciding that “a
public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding”).
72. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 416 (2007) (stating that the “Louisiana court used a method of
aggregation . . . to address the persistent problem of inadequate indigent
defense counsel, but at a different stage—aggregating criminal procedure rights
asserted by criminal defendants before trial”).
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What do we know about jury decision-making at criminal
trials? Few scholars have conducted field studies, but there is the
classic work of the Chicago Jury Trial Project, which surveyed
jurors and judges after trials, and some subsequent field data
surveying jurors concerning their deliberations.73 Scholars have
conducted empirical work on lay understanding of what the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard means.74 Scholars have
conducted more empirical work on capital juries, using posttrial
interviews with jurors as a way to learn more about what played
a role in their decision-making.75 Appellate and postconviction
reversals of trial convictions can be studied for patterns of error,
suggesting, for example, in capital cases, that there are higher
reversal rates in cases involving juveniles and mentally ill
defendants.76 There has also been assessment of access to counsel
and quality of representation at juvenile delinquency hearings.77
Using experimental techniques, social scientists have done
far more to study criminal trials, focusing on the impact of
different types of evidence and their presentation to jurors, as
well as on jury decision-making. Social scientists conduct mock
juror studies aiming to simulate juror deliberations, or study how

73. See PAULA HANNFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM?
(2002), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/199372.pdf; HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); SIMON, supra note 18, at 197–98;
Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research
on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 (2001).
74. See SIMON, supra note 18, at 195–97 (summarizing research, and noting
more mixed and limited experimental research on the effect of standard of proof
on verdict decisions).
75. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale,
Design and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1043 (1995) (providing
a general overview of the research project entitled the Capital Jury Project). For
an overview of the research on capital sentencing, see SIMON, supra note 18, at
188–91.
76. See JAMES LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: PART II: WHY THERE IS SO
MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT? 400–03
(2002), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf.
77. See generally CATHRYN CRAWFORD ET AL., ILLINOIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/cfjc/documents
/ILAssessmentReport.pdf (reporting findings of a comprehensive study of legal
representation of juveniles in Illinois and making recommendations for
improvement).
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laypersons evaluate evidence.78 Additional social science research
has examined how lay jurors understand expert and scientific
evidence. Studies have, for example, examined how laypeople do
not understand much of the decades-old research on eyewitness
identifications, and they may overvalue the confidence of
eyewitnesses.79 There is evidence that laypeople do not
understand how false confessions can happen. It does not take
social science to appreciate that “a confession is like no other
evidence . . . ‘the defendant’s own confession is probably the most
probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against
him.’”80 Social scientists have documented how powerful
confession evidence can be to jurors, despite the Supreme Court’s
ruling that confession evidence can in theory be harmless, as well
as powerfully impacting judges.81 Studies have shown that
laypeople do not always accurately evaluate certain types of
forensic science evidence, while certain other types of
exaggerated forensic claims may not overly prejudice jurors.82
78. See Devine, supra note 73, at 626–27 (discussing several research
studies on jury behavior).
79. See Sarah L. Desmarais & J. Don Read, After Thirty Years, What Do We
Know About What Jurors Know? A Meta-Analytic Review of Lay Knowledge
Regarding Eyewitness Factors, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 200, 209 (2011)
(“Importantly, even if the majority of jurors hold the deemed correct opinion,
such opinion may or may not be an adequate safeguard against [over belief] of
eyewitness evidence.”).
80. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (quoting Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139–40 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
81. Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An
Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27–
46 (1997) (finding that mock jurors would convict at higher rates in cases
involving high-pressure involuntary confessions than in cases with no confession
in evidence); D. Brian Wallace & Saul Kassin, Harmless Error Analysis: How Do
Judges Respond to Confession Errors, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 152 (2012)
(describing results of study showing that judges found high-pressure coerced
confession, though improperly admitted into evidence, to be highly probative of
guilt, though also capable of evaluating whether error was harmful).
82. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by DNA
Match Statistics?, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493, 493–513 (2001) (“Research with
non-DNA statistical evidence showed that, in general, people attach less weight
to the statistical evidence than would seem appropriate, and are insensitive to
variations in the diagnosticity of the statistical evidence.” (citations omitted));
Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic
Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear,
33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 436, 436 (2009) (“Qualitative testimony was more
damaging to the defense than quantitative testimony, conclusion testimony
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Saul Kassin and others have more recently developed how
evidence in a case is related, and for example, confessions may
also result in “a chain of confirmation biases” that affect
investigators, perceptions of other evidence in the case, and
postconviction review.83
B. Postconviction Judging
To what extent has social science impacted postconviction
judging? Postconviction analysis of effectiveness of attorney
performance is predictably deferential. Judges may deny relief
when defendants raise challenges to the misuse of such central
forms of evidence—including when relief is denied by making
claims about what the jury might have concluded that are based
on speculation. Judges assessing claims postconviction may
simply not always be in a position to accurately assess what
impact failures of counsel had on the trial. To be sure, one can
find decisions emphasizing failures of counsel to challenge central
evidence, like forensics.84 Yet one can also find examples in which
courts acknowledge a failure to challenge central evidence in the
prosecution case, but nevertheless finding any error to have been
insufficiently prejudicial.85 Postconviction judges, for example,
may view the demeanor of a witness as something that only the
jurors could accurately weigh. In some instances, as with
increased the defendant’s culpability ratings when findings were presented
quantitatively, and expressing limitations of forensic science had no appreciable
effect.”).
83. See Saul Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOL.
431, 441 (2012) (stating that “false confessions, once taken, arouse a strong
inference of guilt, thereby unleashing a chain of confirmation biases that make
the consequences difficult to overcome despite innocence”).
84. See, e.g., Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 362 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The
scientific evidence of arson was . . . fundamental to the State’s case. Yet Richey’s
counsel did next to nothing to determine if the State’s arson conclusion was
impervious to attack.”); Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 332 (1st Cir. 2005)
(finding “failure to thoroughly investigate the ‘not arson’ defense and seek
expert assistance cannot be classified as a conscious, reasonably informed
tactical decision”).
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 751 (N.D. Iowa
2012) (“Moreover, cumulative determination of deficient performance, standing
alone, would provide no basis for relief, because prejudice must also be proved.”).
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eyewitness testimony, it may be quite to the contrary; demeanor
may mislead jurors and create a barrier to accurate fact-finding.
There is little evidence that postconviction judges rely on the
social science literature on jury decision-making to reach their
results. Such research is very rarely cited in such judicial
rulings.86 As Jason Solomon puts it, “courts rarely rely on actual
social science research about the effects of different kinds of
evidence, argument, or instructions on jurors.”87 (One exception
from the Supreme Court was Justice Souter’s dissent in Strickler
v. Greene,88 citing social science evidence on the role of counsel in
capital mitigation trials.)89
My work on postconviction Strickland v. Washington
litigation has focused on the unusual but striking experiences of
persons later exonerated by DNA testing. Those innocent people
brought ineffective assistance of counsel claims in large numbers,
as do most postconviction litigants. Almost one-third of the first
250 people exonerated by DNA brought such claims, of those who
had written decisions during their appeals and postconviction
proceedings.90 They rarely succeeded.91 Some even failed to obtain
86. Jeffrey O. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in
the Supreme Court’s Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV.
309, 331 (2002) (“There is little suggestion . . . that appellate judges conducting
harmless error review inform their review with insight derived from
[substantial literature on jury decisionmaking].”).
87. Jason Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can Help
Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1071
(2005).
88. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
89. See, e.g., id. at 305 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing William J. Bowers et
al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors’ Predispositions, GuiltTrial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476,
1486–96 (1998)).
90. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 205 (2011) [hereinafter, GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT] (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the most frequently raised
claims during postconviction proceedings, and 32% of these DNA exonerees (52
of 165 cases) asserted that their trial was unfair because their defense lawyer
was inadequate.”); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 55, 76 (2008) (examining “data regarding evidence supporting . . .
wrongful convictions, including the interaction of multiple types of evidence”).
91. See GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 90, at 206 (stating
that of the fifty-two who asserted such claims, only four earned reversals).
Those four were Ron Williamson, in which trial counsel failed to show he was
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relief when their complaint was that their trial lawyer failed to
seek DNA testing.92 One would think that those claims would be
particularly straightforward ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. However, judges held that the DNA would not have made
a difference—of course it did, and when they later managed to
obtain the DNA, it cleared them.93 Many failures of counsel were
never litigated. Only fourteen exonerees made claims regarding
failures of their lawyers to challenge forensic evidence.94 Yet
invalid forensic evidence with outright inaccuracies was
presented in a vast number of trials, and more often than not, the
defense lawyers failed to even ask a single question in their crossexamination addressing the errors forensic analysts made on the
stand.95 Interestingly, far more exonerees obtained reversals on
claims related to prosecutorial or police misconduct, including
Brady v. Maryland violations, than they did on Strickland v.
Washington claims.96
Making for particularly dark anecdotes, some of the
exonerees who had no success raising ineffective assistance
claims received now-notoriously poor assistance. For example,
Jimmy Ray Bromgard was represented in Montana by a lawyer
nicknamed “Jailhouse John Adams,” due to his reputation for his
clients being convicted, and who failed to hire any investigators
or experts, made no motions to suppress, offered no opening
statement, did not prepare his client to testify (getting his name
wrong) and failed to file an appeal. Bromgard lost his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.97 Years later, after his exoneration,
mentally incompetent to stand trial and that another man confessed to the
crime, among a series of failures, and the related cases of Paula Gray, William
Rainge, and Dennis Williams, all represented by the same lawyer, who failed to
move to suppress a range of central evidence, and was later disbarred for
conduct in another case. Id.
92. See id. at 206–07 (stating that only one of four ineffective assistance of
counsel claims received a reversal when counsel failed to ask for DNA testing).
93. See id. at 207 (“The DNA testing could have potentially proven [the
defendants’] innocence, as it later did.”).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 207–08 (stating that ten of twenty-one exonerees received a
reversal based in part on prosecutorial misconduct, which included claims of
unjustly prejudicial argument and Brady v. Maryland claims).
97. See id. at 165–66.
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he did obtain a large settlement in a civil suit, and Montana
would finally create a state public defender’s office.98 That said,
these examples from DNA exoneration cases merely confirm what
observers have been saying for years, calling the Strickland v.
Washington test a malleable “foggy mirror” test, under which any
living breathing lawyer will do, and relief may be denied even in
death penalty cases in which lawyers literally fell asleep at trial
or presented no meaningful case.99
Should judges so readily find error harmless, particularly as
to error by counsel relating to evidence with a strong factual or
emotional impact? Judges in the postconviction context typically
say they cannot judge the credibility of witnesses. Yet some
expressions by witnesses are particularly suspect—for example,
the self-reported confidence of an eyewitness testifying on the
stand at trial and pointing out the defendant, who is not hard to
identify sitting next to the defense lawyer. Meanwhile, trials may
tend to involve closer cases, in which the evidence is closer, and
in which jurors may be more prone to rely on potentially biasing
factors.100 Jurors may look at some evidence holistically and
based on narratives—the ability of defense lawyers to provide a
counter-narrative, such as by developing an alibi or an account of
third-party guilt, may also be important in ways not understood
by postconviction judges.101
Can curative instructions compensate for errors by counsel?
Perhaps sometimes, but it is far less likely when instructions ask
jurors to somehow ignore prejudicial evidence that they heard.102
98. See id. at 165–66 (discussing Bromgard’s case).
99. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1852 (1994) (“The
vice president of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association once described the
simple test used in that state to determine whether a defendant receives
adequate counsel as ‘the mirror test.’ ‘You put a mirror under the courtappointed lawyer’s nose, and if the mirror clouds up, that’s adequate counsel.’”).
100. See SIMON, supra note 18, at 168–69 (discussing factors that complicate
the jury’s fact-finding task).
101. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 519–57 (1991)
(discussing the juror as a “sense-making information processor who strives to
create a meaningful summary of the evidence available that explains what
happened in the events depicted through witnesses, exhibits, and arguments at
trial”).
102. See David A. Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other,
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Perhaps judges should take more account of social science work
examining when such instructions are effective and when they
are not—then again, perhaps judges sitting postconviction are no
better at disregarding the prejudicial evidence admitted at trial
than the jurors may have been.103 Perhaps handling
postconviction review differently under the existing standard—
with the meaning of “prejudice” informed by social science—
would be too much to expect of judges, who may be affected by the
same cognitive biases as jurors, and perhaps additional ones,
such as confirmation bias, when they view a cold written record
after a conviction. Yet as discussed next, one does see judges
making more use of social science, not postconviction, but to
regulate the pretrial criminal investigation process.
C. Two Prongs at Cross-Purposes?
Social science evidence may be a double-edged sword and it
may raise still more troubling questions about the impact of
lawyering on jurors. Defense lawyers may be expected to use
cross-examination or other techniques that will in fact be quite
powerful to a jury—and that will be powerful because they
obscure the truth, create more uncertainty in the witness, arouse
emotional responses, introduce seeming inconsistencies, and the
like. Then again, such tactics may backfire and suggest to jurors
that the defense has no strong case of its own.104 What weight
should judges place on research concerning trial tactics—or do
65 STAN. L. REV. 407, 409 (2013) (arguing that “evidentiary instructions
probably do work, but imperfectly, and better under some conditions than
others; and, second, that we probably could get along fine without trusting in
evidentiary instructions, and certainly without believing that they work
flawlessly”). Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial
Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469–92 (2006) (reporting that judicial instruction to ignore
inadmissible evidence does not necessarily eliminate the impact of this
evidence).
103. Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in
Evaluating Evidence, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 1–9 (2007), http://www.
pennumbra.com/responses/03-2007/Spellman.pdf.
104. Dan Simon discusses these features of cross-examination and other
strategies by lawyers during criminal trials. See SIMON, supra note 18, at 170–
74, 180–83.
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they perhaps have it right to simply presume that tactical
decisions deserve great deference and leave it to the practitioners
to study and develop tactics? How about research surrounding
other factors that affect persuasion? If it is true that jurors also
place great weight on “superficial persuasive devices,” as Dan
Simon terms them, such as the demeanor, appearance, tone, and
other aspects of the defense lawyer, perhaps far more so than on
whether the lawyer makes a motion to suppress or an argument
in closings105—should judges make any use of that social science?
If the defense lawyer failed to make eye contact with the
jury, was longwinded and boring, never cracked a smile, and had
a persistent cough—and that may have outweighed the sound law
and evidence the lawyer marshaled at trial—should there ever be
a Strickland v. Washington claim? Those are matters of trial
“strategy” or matters within the wide range of professional
performance that the Court sensibly finds not to be of
constitutional significance. Those are matters in which we might
not care to intrude, personal style and characteristics of the
defense lawyer. We would not want to regulate professionals in
that manner (would we, for example, want to insist as a
constitutional matter that lawyers dress in a conservative, or
gendered way, to suit the local jury pool?). Yet if one cared purely
about the accuracy of trial outcomes, such “superficial,” but quite
prejudicial, forms of persuasion and lawyering could be
potentially important. Regardless, it may turn out that such
matters of style and expression, even when they do matter,
cannot be readily regulated through improved procedures,
whereas research can identify other more concrete procedures
that can improve outcomes.
The ineffective assistance test is at war with itself. There
may be quite prejudicial conduct that is currently treated as a
matter of strategy or reasonable within norms of professional
practice. There may be outright violations of professional norms
or outright wrong strategies that do not prejudice the outcome at
trial. Professional standards and legal ethics may trump
accuracy. There are sound normative reasons why courts have
105. See id. at 170 (stating that jurors are affected by superficial persuasion
devices such as emotional appeals, metaphors, irony, rhetorical questions,
humor, and the likeability of the speaker, each of which has little to do with the
accuracy of the information).
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limited their focus to only certain categories of failures of counsel.
However, they may have erred too far in limiting relief to chiefly
dramatic across-the-board failures of counsel, conflicts of interest,
breakdowns during capital sentencing, and extreme failures to
communicate during plea bargaining.
Judges might broaden the lens with some more confidence,
informed by social science. Judges may be understandably
reluctant to define additional areas of concern—but having more
social science research to identify areas of prejudice that strongly
affect jurors may make it far easier to then decide whether as a
constitutional matter, judges should be concerned if lawyers fall
short.
IV. Validating Gideon v. Wainwright
Judges and social scientists have opposite tendencies,
perhaps. Judges may be most reluctant to overemphasize
accuracy during trials. They do not readily revisit trial verdicts,
and may be particularly deferential to finality of judgments,
lawyers’ professional practice norms, customary evidentiary
rules, and trial judge discretion concerning evidentiary rulings.
Judges may be more open to regulating accuracy pretrial,
however. One leading recent example is the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Henderson,106 which provides a
detailed social science framework for regulating eyewitness
identifications, and among other things, calls for detailed jury
instructions that provide a roadmap to defense lawyers,
prosecutors, and judges for what issues should be litigated in any
case involving an eyewitness.107
Social scientists may have the opposite tendency. Social
scientists are perhaps too focused on improving the accuracy of
trials, not on professional roles of lawyers or plea bargaining
settlements without any trial. One limitation of the entirety of
106. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
107. Id. at 919–22 (advocating for a “revised framework [that allows] all
relevant system and estimator variables to be explored and weighted at pretrial
hearings where there is some actual evidence of suggestiveness; and . . .
enhanced jury charges to help jurors evaluate eyewitness identification
evidence”).
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existing social science research is its focus on evidence and jury
decision-making. Jury confidentiality has prevented much study
of deliberation of actual jurors.108 Yet there are very few trials of
any kind in the U.S., including criminal trials. Not only, as
Barbara Spellman and Frederick Schauer have developed,109 has
the role of judges been underexamined by social scientists, but
the roles of other key figures in our system of justice have been
underexamined. Lawyers have not been adequately studied, with
the main exception, as noted, of studies of lawyering regarding
issues of competence and juveniles.110 The role of lawyers in
shaping the evidence at trial—and particularly the role of defense
counsel investigating evidence as part of the defense case, such as
alibi evidence and supportive character witnesses—has not been
sufficiently studied.
Still more important, there is very little social science
studying the vast bulk of cases resolved through plea
bargaining—in marked contrast to a far larger literature on
settlement in civil cases and the role of lawyers, in which the
monetary stakes on either side may make for more readily
quantified units of analysis.111 Plea bargaining raises fascinating
questions about what actually affects defendant decisions
whether to accept a plea. Criminal law scholars have long
explored the practical dynamics of plea bargaining and debated
108. This may be changing. See Barbara Spellman & Frederick Schauer,
Law and Social Cognition, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION (D. Carlston ed.)
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 17–18), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000806.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1996)
(discussing the prevalence of settlement in civil litigation); Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Getting To No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 322 (1991) (examining
settlement negotiations and outcomes by considering the social and economic
context of litigation); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics,
and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 82
(1997) (discussing how lawyers and litigants evaluate law suits); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 129–42 (1994) (examining social
science research to explore why and when litigants settle suits); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
113, 116–18 (1996) (discussing litigation from an economical perspective).
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whether prosecutorial discretion, sentencing rules, defense
incentives, and other institutional features produce optimal or
fair or accurate results.112 Scholars such as Stephanos Bibas,
Richard Birke, Alafair Burke, and Rebecca Hollander Blumoff
have increasingly connected social science research on cognitive
bias and heuristics to the practice of plea bargaining and
suggested that a range of factors might have important effects on
plea bargaining, including incomplete information, time
discounting, risk preferences, framing during negotiation, and
group motivation of lawyers, among others.113
Very little research has studied the complex process of plea
bargaining directly—a complicated and time-consuming endeavor
112. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s
Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
931, 932–34 (1983) (discussing several deficiencies in the plea bargaining
process); Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty,
49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 353 (2006) (“By restricting the permissible sentence
reduction in a plea bargain, the law can preclude plea bargains in cases with a
low probability of conviction.”); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2472 (2004) (discussing prosecutorial
motivations for obtaining plea bargains); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2008) (arguing that “inaccurate guilty pleas are
merely symptomatic of errors at the points of arrest, charge, or trial”); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1992 (1992)
(discussing a prohibition on mandatory minimum sentences); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1913–17
(1992) (discussing whether the norm of expanded choice justifies enforcement of
plea bargains); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 37 (2002) (discussing plea bargaining as a “zero
sum” tradeoff).
113. See Bibas, supra note 112, at 2520 (discussing the susceptibility of
lawyers to heuristics and biases); Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and
Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 208 (proposing hypotheses attempting to
reconcile the rate of guilty pleas and the principle of loss aversion); Alafair S.
Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2006) (discussing the probability
that prosecutors fall prey to cognitive failures); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff,
Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L.
REV. 163, 165 (2007) [hereinafter Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology]
(discussing “why the rational actor paradigm in plea bargaining may not
capture the reality of the negotiation between prosecutor and defense counsel,
and why lawyers may not be likely to lessen the effects of cognitive bias and
heuristics”); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Note, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea
Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 121–25 (1997)
[hereinafter Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”] (exploring the intersection
of plea bargaining with contemporary negotiation theory).
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to be sure, but more work is beginning to be done, and more can
be done.114 The field work by Milton Heumann is still a landmark
in the area,115 but there have been persistent bar association
reports describing overburdened defense lawyers and thin
representation during plea bargaining.116 There is every reason to
think that empirical work and experimental psychology can tell
us more about the plea bargaining process.117 Studies could
further examine each of the social and psychological factors that
scholars have suggested might play an important role in plea
bargaining, such as: the extent to which clients are riskpreferring or -averse,118 the role that incomplete information
plays, and the extent to which lawyers shape clients’
understanding of the implications of features of a plea bargain.
There is a vast social science literature on cognitive bias and
heuristics, beginning with the groundbreaking work of Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky.119 The roles such biases play in
114. See Vanessa A. Edkins, Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations and
Client Race: Does Zealous Representation Apply Equally to All?, 35 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 413, 416 (2011) (studying the role of race by surveying practicing
defense attorneys and noting “a dearth of prior empirical research looking at the
factors that affect plea negotiations”); see also Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects
of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened Punishment, and Assumed Role on Mock
Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 59 (1984)
(discussing how multiple variables affect decisions to accept or reject plea
bargains).
115. See generally MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978).
116. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE, A REPORT ON THE AM. BAR. ASS’N’S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 17 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp
_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing the
effects that overburdened attorneys have an quality representation).
117. Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty,” supra note 113, at 124 (citing
empirical studies to demonstrate that prosecutors bluff “when evidence against
a defendant is weak or deficient”).
118. See Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerety, Some Experimental Evidence
on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties
and Risk, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 123 (1995) (investigating “whether there are
group differences in the relative responsiveness to changes in the certainty and
severity of punishment”).
119. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A
Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 45, 45 (Kenneth J.
Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (exploring “some implications for conflict resolution of a
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the plea bargaining context should be studied far more. They
could deeply inform prosecutors and defense lawyers and judges.
Additional work could study how development of evidence in
early stages of criminal cases affects plea bargaining. The roles of
lawyers could be studied. If evidence strength plays a role in plea
bargaining,120 do defense lawyers properly assess the strength of
evidence and do they have enough information to do so? Do
defense lawyers, for example, sufficiently understand what can
potentially cause a false confession, and the role that
interrogation procedures play in producing accurate and false
confessions?121 Do defense lawyers properly understand expert
evidence, or forensic science evidence—and does the presence of
that evidence tend to alter defense strategies—and if so, how?
More targeted studies could examine questions of Strickland v.
Washington “prejudice” in the context of what advice lawyers
should give to clients considering particular types of plea
bargains. For example, studies could be done of noncitizens:
would they take a plea knowing that it would have potentially
severe immigration consequences?
Perhaps we could avoid difficult procedural analysis in the
postconviction context. Perhaps social science evidence could not
only help us to assess failures of counsel after the fact, but also
suggest ways to deliver effective representation before the fact.
Social science evidence is often thought of as helping to frame
evidence for a jury (including using experts and jury
instructions), but it is also influential in developing procedures to
particular cognitive analysis of individual decision making”); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237, 237
(1973) (exploring “the rules that determine intuitive predictions and judgments
of confidence and contrast[ing] these rules to normative principles of statistical
prediction”).
120. See Greg M. Kramer et al., Plea Bargaining Recommendations by
Criminal Defense Attorneys: Evidence Strength, Potential Sentence, and
Defendant Preference, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 573, 575–85 (2007) (studying the
effects of evidence strength, potential sentences, and defendant preferences on
plea bargaining strategies employed by criminal defense attorneys).
121. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2010) (discussing the typical
chain of events surrounding a wrong confession). For a study of self-reported
false guilty pleas, see Allison D. Redlich et al., Self-Reported False Confessions
and False Guilty Pleas Among Offenders with Mental Illness, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 79 (2010).
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investigate legal cases in the first instance and to guide
government actors. For example, in the eyewitness context, social
science evidence has revolutionized the ways that line-ups are
done, improving the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, better
documenting the procedures, and providing information that
counsel can far more effectively make use of when representing a
client.122 What made Gideon a watershed right was its focus on
providing an entitlement at the time of felony charging, rather
than establishing criminal procedure regulations for conduct of
attorneys and other actors farther downstream. We can try to
improve the Strickland analysis, and make more accurate
assessments of whether inadequate defense counsel sufficiently
prejudiced the outcome at trials or during plea bargaining.
However, we could also better allocate resources on the front end
to improve defense access to evidence and investigative resources
at the time of trial. Doing just that has been the focus of habeas
reform proposals for some time—and such proposals have been
ignored for just as long.
Perhaps more productive would be to learn from the specific
deficiencies in the postconviction process and identify areas of
error—validating Gideon—to help at least to prioritize resources
to avoid the most serious miscarriages of justice. Darryl Brown
has suggested that defense resources must be (and are) inevitably
rationed in a world of limited defense resources—perhaps that
rationing can itself be validated.123 Lisa Griffin has developed
ways that narratives at trial may impact the reliability of jury
decisionmaking and has explored a range of mechanisms that
could counter certain types of narrative bias.124 I have previously
suggested that litigation pretrial, of the sort brought in state
court challenges to indigent defense inadequacies, might avoid

122. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 451, 453 (2012) (discussing the impact on social science research on
eyewitness identification).
123. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 810 (2004)
(discussing the consequence of rationing criminal defense funding).
124. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281,
315–25 (2013) (exploring means by which “trial mechanics—from discovery
obligations through appellate review of evidentiary errors—might counterweigh
certain kinds of narrative bias”).
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postconviction barriers and focus more directly on the primary
needs of defense lawyers to adequately represent their clients.125
Such efforts may run into a series of other constitutional
criminal procedure rulings by the Court, not directly related to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but which may handicap
defense counsel. For example, defense lawyers may have their
hands tied behind their backs when trying to understand and
explain powerful but technical forensic evidence to a jury. The
Court has recognized only very limited rights of indigent
defendants to nonlawyer assistance. Indigent defense lawyers
may have scant resources to investigate their cases. Further,
experts, more expensive still than investigators, may be difficult
to come by. In Ake v. Oklahoma126 the Court recognized that
psychiatric assistance is crucial in a case revolving around an
insanity defense.127 The Court has only “held open” the possibility
of an entitlement to other types of experts, including forensic
experts.128 Postconviction challenges to failures to appoint experts
or failures to challenge government forensic experts may be a
fruitless avenue. Far more direct would be a Gideon-type
entitlement to broader expert assistance. Perhaps additional
research on the impact of forensic testimony on jurors and the
role that experts can play might play some role in developing
such an entitlement. Responding to an increasingly understood
need, some cutting edge public defenders are starting to create
specialist positions for lawyers who work on forensics-related
litigation. In addition, scientific efforts to improve the validity
and reliability of forensics, and provide scientific standards for
crime laboratories themselves, may also have the benefit of giving

125. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 398 (2007) (discussing the effectiveness of pretrial litigation).
126. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
127. See id. at 84 (holding that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial
judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at
trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
psychiatrist . . . .”).
128. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (“Given that
petition offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested
assistance [of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics
expert] would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of due process in the trial
judge’s decision.”).
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defense counsel more information about what forensic analysis
actually means, and improving the quality of the representation.
Of course, apart from reducing information asymmetry
during negotiations, broader discovery inexpensively empowers
counsel and perhaps reduces the need to secure investigative
assistance. Improved discovery could play a particularly useful
role during plea bargaining. A plea bargain can currently be
conditioned on waiving the right to view Brady material that the
prosecution would be constitutionally obligated to show to the
defense at trial.129 Perhaps access-to-courts arguments can also
support entitlements, for example, to underlying forensic reports,
or broader “open-file” type access to police reports and other such
documents well before any criminal trial.130
A series of scholars, including myself, Darryl Brown, and
Dan Simon, have described a change in focus from adversarial
procedures towards more accurate investigations of criminal
cases. Perhaps the next generation of Gideon litigation will focus
on providing the tools that defense lawyers need to challenge
unreliable evidence.131 We need validated performance measures
for defense lawyering—not to overly quantify the difficult, casespecific work that lawyers must do—but to better understand
what resources we need to improve the accuracy and fairness of
the system. As discussed, it is in pretrial development of evidence
that one sees judges increasingly make use of social science
evidence—as social scientists increasingly do work of direct
129. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002) (“Although the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments provide, as part of the Constitution’s ‘fair trial’
guarantee, that defendants have the right to receive exculpatory impeachment
material from prosecutors, . . . a defendant who pleads guilty foregoes a fair trial
as well as various other accompanying constitutional guarantees.” (internal
citation omitted)).
130. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 190–92 (1971) (discussing the right
to transcript in misdemeanor criminal case); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20
(1956) (noting a right for indigent defendant to receive a transcript of criminal
trial required for appeal). But see Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495
(1963) (noting that the Griffin requirement may be flexible, and “[a]lternative
methods of reporting trial proceedings are permissible if they place before the
appellate court an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the
appellant’s contentions arise”).
131. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and Rise of
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005)
(discussing generally the “constraints of defense counsel”).

958

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 927 (2013)

relevance to lawyers. Ineffective assistance of counsel litigation
may change as a result.
V. Conclusion
Fifty years after Gideon called it into a more organized
existence, there are many challenges facing the indigent defense
bar. As we know from available data, but still have difficulty
imagining, each year public defenders represent a vast number of
clients, over six million indigent defendants, and court-appointed
lawyers represent still more.132 Avoiding wrongful convictions
and unfair outcomes in serious cases, much less run of the mill
petty cases, is only one of the many challenges indigent defense
counsel face, given crushing caseloads and scant resources. That
said, the resources to adequately evaluate ubiquitous forms of
forensic evidence, obtaining adequate discovery before entering
plea bargains, and other procedures, could improve results within
existing resource constraints. Further, the Strickland v.
Washington test is internally inconsistent—and underexamined.
More information about what attorney conduct is actually
prejudicial to clients’ interests could help to assess whether that
conduct should be constitutionally regulated.
It is a comfortable armchair task for a lawyer to imagine
ambitious scientific research agendas, suggesting this or that
could be studied, without having to actually conduct challenging
empirical research projects. That said, the lawyer’s wish list
might include a long list of studies sketched out here, which focus
more on the roles of lawyers and clients during plea bargaining,
together with what makes for “effective” counsel at criminal
trials, including based on pretrial investigative work. Even if
judges did not take note of such research, increasingly datadriven public defender offices could use such research to better
represent their clients. Such a body of knowledge might not lead
to a watershed development of constitutional law, but there is
nothing wrong with incremental change. While there may never
again be a case like Gideon, the drama of a first-time
132. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES,
2007—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07
st.pdf.
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constitutional ruling may eventually be eclipsed by careful
contributions of lawyers, judges, scientists, and policymakers.
Perhaps if lawyers look more to social science research and if
social scientists look more to the roles played by lawyers, real
improvements to the quality of criminal justice can result.

